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Casenotes
JOINT TENANCY IS NOT SEVERED BY
EXECUTION
JUDGMENT LIEN IS NECESSARY
Eder v. Rothamel'
The appellant, (plaintiff below), secured a judgment
against William H. Rothamel for $800 with interest and
costs on January 15, 1940. On January 10, 1952, he caused
to be issued out of the Superior Court of Baltimore City a
writ of Scire Facias against the heirs, administrators and
terre tenants of said judgment debtor to keep alive and in
force the said judgment and lien thereon. At the time of
the docketing of the judgment the debtor had been seized
and possessed of an undivided interest as a joint tenant in
certain fee simple property in Baltimore City with three
other such tenants. Without any execution having been
attempted on the judgment, the debtor died on January 18,
1941. One of the surviving tenants subsequently died on
October 28, 1947, and the two survivors thereafter on May
15, 1951, conveyed the property to a bona fide purchaser
for value. The subsequent purchaser and various interested
parties defended against the action, which was heard on
an agreed statement of facts. The sole question on appeal
was: Will the interest of one joint tenant, who is a judgment debtor upon his death, pass to his surviving joint
tenant free from the lien of the judgment, when no execution on the said judgment had been made during the lifetime of the judgment debtor? In rendering judgment for
the defendants the Superior Court (Carter, J.) held that
the right of survivorship prevailed over that of the encumbrance and once the judgment lien was subordinated to
this vested equity there remained no property of the deceased debtor which could be subject to execution.
In an excellent review and analysis of similar proceedings in other jurisdictions and the text authorities,2 Judge
Carter was led to the sound opinion that the mere burden
of a judgment lien, without execution, upon the interest of
one of several joint tenants will not interrupt any of the
characteristic unities of that tenancy so as to effect a sever'95 A. 2d 860 (Md., 1953).
'TIFFANY, RPAl PRoPEa'ry (3rd Ed., 1939), See. 425, and others.
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ance that would retain such a property interest in such tenant's heirs as would be subject to execution.3
The rights of judgment creditors being derived wholly
from statute, the appellant on appeal contended that the
history of those pertinent Maryland statutes had been to
subordinate the right of survivorship in favor of the right
of encumbrance. In support of this statutory interpretation
the appellant argued for a strict construction of the Statute
of 1732' and Art. 26 of the 1951 Code in order to exclude
this equity of survivorship. The essence of such contention
was that inasmuch as these statutes made no distinction as
to what type of defendant debtor's property interest would
be subject to the lien and/or execution, it would be improper to delete joint tenancies from the scope of the statutes, in the absence of specific exceptions. The appellant
relied in part on the case of Coombs v. Jordan,5 wherein
the Court of Appeals, in examining the historical basis and
significance of the Act of 1732, held that in order to satisfy
a judgment an undivided interest in a tobacco warehouse
and proceeds should be applied in satisfaction.
However, upon further examination of the Coombs case
it would appear that the Court in that case did not intend
to have their decision extended as far as the appellant contended, for, by dictum, the Court made the definite point
that judicial liens upon real estate or equitable interests in
lands are subject to any prior liens or equities, as to order
of satisfaction. The rule of the Coombs case was merely a
restatement of the proposition that property of a judgment
debtor is generally liable to be seized and sold for the satisfaction of a judgment. Such generalization is not in point
on the present issue, nor did the Court in that case intend
the scope of that generalization to extend to the present
issue. This distinction seems readily justified in view of
the specific language in the case of Lee v. Keech.6 In this
later case the Court, in holding that a judgment creditor of
an heir did not have sufficient interest in the estate to contest a will, stated that the statutory lien of a judgment:
02 COKE UPON LiTT- roN, Sec. 286, p. 184b (1853) ; 2 BLAcKSTONE ComMENTARIES (Lewis's Ed., 1902), Sec. 185; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd
Ed., 1939), Sec. 425; Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P. 2d 118
(1942) ; Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. 2d 358, 161 A. L. R.
1133 (1945.) ; Musa v. Segelke & Kolhaus Company, 224 Wis. 432, 272 N. W.
657, 111 A. L. R. 168 (1937).
"5 George 2, c. 7, 2 ALEXANDEM'S BRITISH STATUTES (Coe's Ed., 1912)
964 - "An Act for the more easy Recovery of Debts in his Majesty's ...
Colonies in America" - 1732; considered in Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland 282
(1831). Codified in Md. Code (1951), Art. 26, Sec. 21.
5 Ibid.
0151 Md. 34, 37, 139 A. 529 (1926).
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"... 'gives the judgment creditor no right to the
land nor any estate in it' . . . 'Such lien secures the
creditor neither jus in rem nor jus ad rem'. . . 'A judgment lien on land... constitutes no property or right
in the land itself. It confers only a right to levy on
same'.. . It has no effect on prior, undisclosed equities,
for the judgment creditor is neither in fact or in law a
bona fide purchaser."
And as to the basis of this lien the Court said:
"Except for the passage of the Act 1904, Ch. 535,
embodied in Code, Art. 16, Sec. 152, the judgment creditor would not, as a general rule, be even a proper party
in a proceeding to partition real estate in which the
debtor is interested. And what the judgment creditor
has is rather in the nature of a remedy, than of an
estate; and as such it is subject to legislative control
and may be changed
by statute without any constitu' 7
tional inhibition.
In Wisconsin, the case of Musa v. Segelke and Kolhaus
Co.,8 citing as supporting authority Lee v. Keech,9 held that
the right of a joint tenant was subject to and limited by the
right of survivorship, and unless the joint tenancy was destroyed during the life time of the joint tenants by an effective severance the interest of the deceased would pass to
the survivor and there would no longer exist any estate or
property rights in the deceased, the mere docketing of a
judgment not of itself being sufficient interruption of any
of the unities to effect such severance.
Also, in California, the case of Zeigler v. Bonnell,10 held
that until a levy is made upon a judgment the property is
not affected by an execution. In discussing the effect of a
judgment lien upon property held in joint tenancy, the
California Court said that if such creditor did not wish to
immediately execute he could:
"... keep his lien alive and wait until the joint
tenancy is terminated by the death of one of the joint
tenants. If the judgment debtor survives, the judgment
lien immediately attaches to the entire property. If the
judgment debtor is the first to die, the lien is lost. If
the creditor sits back to await this contingency, as re7Ibid, 37.
s Supra, n. 3.

Supra, n. 6.
1052 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P. 2d 118 (1942).
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spondent did in this case, he assumes the risk of losing
his lien."'"
In Illinois, this view was enunciated in Spikings v.
Ellis," wherein it was stated:
"The law seems to be well settled that a creditor by
proper action can reach the interest or title to property
held by the debtor in joint tenancy, if he does it before
the life tenant dies, but the same cannot be reached
after the debtor's death, because the title then has become vested in the other joint tenant."
A Canadian court in Power v. Grace,"3 held that a joint
tenancy was not severed so as to defeat the right of survivorship by the mere filing of a writ of ft. fa. in the sheriff's
office by a judgment creditor against a joint tenant. The
court cited as authority Abergavenny's Case,4 which is perhaps the oldest case of record upon the point in concern,
wherein it was held that two joint tenants for life could not
defeat the execution of a creditor of one of the tenants by a
release before execution, but if such judgment debtor died
before execution, the survivor would hold the estate discharged of any such lien or execution.
Thus, a review of the authorities seems to establish that
a judgment does not of itself contain sufficient import so
as to effect a severance of a joint tenancy merely from its
docketing, and that in order to defeat the right of survivorship which arose with the initiation of that tenancy, the
judgment must be satisfied before that equity has had the
opportunity of vesting. Such a conclusion seems to be a
logical application of the principles involving joint tenancies. In order to have a joint tenancy there are four essential elements necessary, which elements are known as "the
four unities". These are: unity of interest, unity of title,
unity of time and unity of possession. In other words, each
of the tenants must have one and the same interest, conveyed by the same act or instrument, which is to vest at
one and the same time, except in cases of uses and executory interests; and each must have entire possession of
every parcel of the property held in joint tenancy as well
as of the whole, for each joint tenant holds the whole jointly
but nothing in severalty (Per my et per tout). A joint
- Ibid, 120-121.
12290 I1. App. 585, 8 N. E. 2d 962, 965 (1937).

1 (1932) Ont. Rep. 357, (1932) 2 D. L. R. 793.
" 6Co. Rep. 78b, 77 Eng. Rep. 373 (1607).
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tenancy once established may be terminated or severed by
any voluntary or involuntary act which would destroy one
or more or the unities; provided, however, that such severance occurs before the death of the joint tenant whose interest is to be alienated (thereby creating a tenancy in
common), and before the surviving joint tenant becomes
owner of the whole by virtue of his right of survivorship,
which would immediately become operative and vested on
death of the deceased joint tenant.
The legal soundness and practical necessity of agreeing
with the weight of authority becomes quite apparent if one
examines the circumstances involving the question of severance by a mortgage by one joint tenant of his undivided
interest in the estate, rather than the docketing of a judgment against such a party. Attention is drawn to dictum in
the principal case wherein the Court stated:
"The joint tenant may mortgage his interest. The
joint tenancy will be destroyed by this conveyance.
Wolf v. Johnston, 157 Md. 112, 145 A. 363; ..."
In those jurisdictions, including Maryland, which adhere
to the "title theory" in regard to the legal import of a mortgage, such dictum is a logical conclusion, for the mortgage
would interrupt the unity of title and effectively sever the
joint tenancy in accordance with the apparent legal intention of the subscribing parties. The consequence is that a
subsequent release of the mortgage would not of itself automatically reinstate the pre-existing joint tenancy, but a new
conveyance would be necessary for such reestablishment,
even though the parties may have actually only contemplated the mortgage as a security measure without interruption of the nature of their estate. In contrast one would
expect a mortgage to have a somewhat different effect in
those states which subscribe to the "lien theory". The logical application of the legal principles applied in the judgment cases would seem to infer that the mere lien would
not effect a severance and destroy the survivorship until
foreclosure, although in Indiana, a "lien theory" state, the
contrary has been held in the case of Wilken v. Young. 0
The theory, application, and practical effect of a judgment
operating upon the interest of a joint tenancy, lies somewhere in the realm between these two mortgage theories.
The ultimate beginning and end of any such inquiry will
rest upon the determination of the intended judicial nature
15Supra, n. 1, 862.
" 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895).
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of a judgment - namely, whether it is intended to be in
the nature of a remedy or in the nature of an estate itself.
In following the decided weight of authority it appears
that the Court of Appeals, in the principal case, has practically and judicially avoided the hardship that would arise
if a docketed judgment were to be given any other effect.
The revelant benefit to be gained would be slight as compared with the possible pitfalls that might well occur if the
Court had departed from the prevailing view. The only material and apparent advantage offered would be to aid judgment creditors who have delayed exercising their remedy,
either at their own election or due to some exceptional
circumstances peculiar to the particular case; whereas,
by adopting the rule set forth in the principal case, the law
penalizes the creditor for his delay in obtaining satisfaction
of his judgment, so as not to disturb the intent of the joint
tenants through a procedure which, unbeknown to them,
would defeat their purposes and original intentions. The
undesirable possibilities that might result from a contrary
holding were pointed out by the appellees in their brief on
appeal. 7 For example, if the docketing of the judgment
severed the joint tenancy, satisfaction of the judgment
would not have the effect of re-establishing such tenancy,
but rather a new conveyance would be necessary. Also, it
would be necessary to conduct much more extensive and
exhaustive back searches of the judgment dockets, for all
judgments would have to be searched whether satisfied or
unsatisfied at the time of the title search and without regard
to the age of the joint estate. The result could be to create
an undesirable situation where a mere nominal judgment
would destroy all intended rights of survivorship in a joint
tenancy of considerable value, solely from the docketing of
such a judgment.
From balancing the respective advantages and disadvantages that might arise under varying circumstances, it
would appear that the common law adage that "The right
of survivorship is preferred to encumbrances", is today as
sound, in theory and practice, as it was in the early development of the law when joint tenancies enjoyed a far more
preferred position than that of today.
17Appellee's

Brief, p. 11.

